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Roll up for the Mystery Tour!1 
 
Nigel Duffield 
University of Sheffield 
 
There's a danger zone, not a stranger zone 
Than the little plot I walk on that I call my home 
Full of eerie sights, weird and skeery sights 
Ev'ry vicious animal that creeps and crawls and bites!! 
 
On the Amazon, the prophylactics prowl  
On the Amazon, the hypodermics howl 
On  the Amazon, you'll hear a scarab scowl, and sting  
…zodiacs on the wing… 
 
Excerpt from ‘On the Amazon.’ Grey/Newman/Ellis.2 
 
E&L’s rich polemic against Language Universals and Universal Grammar 
provides an entertaining, at times dazzling, performance that is most reminiscent of 
modern representations of the Victorian side-show: for those of us of a certain age, 
the fairground scene in Chitty Chitty Bang Bang! meets Sgt. Pepper (Being for the 
benefit of Mr. Kite), as we are presented with all manner of linguistic exotica, from 
languages bereft of consonantal onsets (Arrernte), to those defying the normal laws of 
constituency relations (Jiwarli), to those allegedly lacking even the most fundamental 
grammatical attribute, recursivity (Pirahá).  If, at its worst, E&L’s article evokes the 
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freak show, it also calls to mind the very best in nature documentaries, the image of 
Pablo Fanque replaced by David Attenborough in the rain forest, crouching over some 
particularly unlikely, exquisitely adapted, tree frog. Whichever allusion is the more 
appropriate, this is fascinating material, which should convince even the most 
agoraphobic armchair linguist of the phenomenal wealth of grammatical diversity that 
still remains out there (even at a such a late stage of language extinction). 
Yet, for all that E&L make an irrefutable case for diversity, their case against 
generativist linguistics in general—and Universal Grammar in particular—is much 
less persuasive. Given space constraints I shall restrict attention to what I view as 
three critical failures of argumentation, involving two misunderstandings about the 
content and locus of UG, and a mistaken assumption about the theoretical significance 
of surface diversity. As a consequence of this mishandling of the brief, Universal 
Grammar—to continue the legal metaphor—walks free from the courtroom. 
One of the more obvious misunderstandings of the paper emerges from E&L’s 
discussion of the notion of grammatical subject (Section 4), where it is argued clearly 
but otiosely that the notion of subject most relevant to describing surface 
constructions in English cannot be applied directly, or in any way appropriately, to the 
description of the grammars of other languages. Regarding subjects, E&L write 
(2009: 440): 
 
[L]inguists have also known for some time that the notion “subject’ is far from 
universal, and other languages have come up with strikingly different 
solutions… Having a [unified] subject relation is an efficient way to organize a 
language’s grammar because it bundles up different subtasks that most often 
need to be done together. But languages also need ways to indicate when the 
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properties do not coalesce…Given languages like Dyirbal, Acehnese or 
Tagalog, where the concepts of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are dismembered in 
language-specific ways, it is clear that a child pre-equipped by UG to expect 
its language to have a ‘subject’ could be sorely led astray [emphases mine: 
NGD]. 
 
It is not clear what type of UG E&L have in mind, but it cannot be the 
generativist conception, given that one of the hallmarks of mainstream generativism 
since very early on in the development of the theory—at the very latest since 
Chomsky (1981)—has been precisely its rejection of subject as a unified concept. 
This is most clearly stated in the following paragraph from McCloskey (2001): 
 
…[I]n the intellectual tradition represented by the frameworks of ‘Government 
and Binding’, ‘Principles and Parameters’ and the ‘Minimalist Program’, the 
notions [‘subject’ and ‘object’: NGD] play no (recognized) role at all. That 
tradition has always insisted that talk of ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ is either illicit 
or casual, and that reference to such terms is to be cashed out in terms of more 
primitive notions (phrase-structural measures of prominence, featural 
properties of heads, the theory of A-movement and so on)… McCloskey 
(2001: 157). 
 
Generativists might disagree with functionalists about precisely which 
grammatical primitives interact to yield epiphenomenal ‘subject effects’ (even 
though—somewhat ironically—E&L’s tri-partite distinction (topic/agent/pivot, p. 40) 
is commonly accepted, if differently formalized), but there is really no general 
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disagreement about whether ‘subject’ has any theoretical status. It follows from this 
that no generative acquisitionist assumes—as E&L appear to—that a child “equipped 
by UG” would expect his language to have a subject, for the simple reason that this is 
never claimed to be part of UG. 
If E&L misunderstand the content of UG, they also appear to misunderstand 
its ontology (in the computer science sense of the term): specifically, the relationship 
between UG and properties of end-state grammars. As Chomsky and others have 
repeatedly tried to articulate—albeit with changes in terminology over the years—UG 
is a theory of the initial state, which Chomsky now terms FL (Faculty of Language), 
not of any particular endstate grammar (LEnglish, LJiwarli, LPirahá, etc.,). That UG/FL is 
ontologically distinct from any particular L is clear from this recent quote: 
 
I understand L (for me, some variety of English) to be an attained state of a 
genetically-determined faculty of language FL…’ (Chomsky, cited in 
Stemmer 1999: 1) 
 
The problem is not merely that UG is not claimed to be a property of final 
state grammars, but that it need not even be definitional of these grammars. As far 
back as the mid-seventies, Chomsky entertains the idea that the core properties of 
final state grammars are not exclusively, or even mainly, determined by UG 
principles: 
 
I have been assuming that UG suffices to determine particular grammars 
(where again, a grammar is a system of rules and principles that generates an 
infinite class of sentences with their formal and semantic properties). But this 
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might not be the case. It is a coherent and perhaps correct proposal that the 
language faculty constructs a grammar only in conjunction with other faculties 
of mind. If so, the language faculty itself provides only an abstract framework, 
an idealization that does not suffice to determine a grammar (Chomsky 1975: 
41) [emphasis mine: NGD]. 
 
Now, obviously one can take issue with the idea of any apriori knowledge of 
language, whether in the form of autonomous syntactic principles (Move, Merge, etc), 
as theories of UG/FL would have it, or in any other form (e.g. Slobin 1973, Bickerton 
1984, Klein & Perdue 1997, amongst others): most cognitivists, for example, reject 
the idea of any crosslinguistic consistency in the initial state of language acquisition; 
see e.g. Tomasello 1995). In the end, whether UG exists and what form it takes are—
or should be—empirical questions, albeit difficult ones. However, the crucial point 
here is that facts about attained, endstate grammars bear only tangentially on theories 
of UG. Baldly stated, the absence of Language Universals—granting for the sake of 
argument that these are a ‘myth’—does not imply the absence of UG. This is not 
simply an issue of abstractness (as E&L seem to believe, in their disparaging 
comment ‘expert linguistic eyes can spot the underlying common constructional 
bedrock, p. 432’). It is, rather, a category error: no matter how deep one digs into 
mature grammatical systems, there is no logical reason to expect that one will 
excavate UG in any recognizable form, any more than one should discover universal 
principles of embryology through an in-depth study of mature organisms. 
The final point to address is less a direct misunderstanding about UG than an 
implicit misconception that runs throughout the paper, namely, the idea that surface 
diversity presents some kind of prima facie threat to proponents of UG, that UG is 
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challenged in direct proportion to the divergence between English and the weirdest, 
most exotic alternatives. In fact, quite the opposite is true: UG thrives—indeed 
depends—on diversity. This is so for two reasons. The first is an epistemological one: 
if it is true that children acquiring language settle quickly and effortlessly on uniform 
endstate grammars regardless of the properties of the language being acquired, then 
the case for innate grammatical knowledge is strengthened the greater the variability 
in the final state rule-systems and in the external conditions of language acquisition.  
Looked at the other way around, if there were clear and obvious Language Universals 
manifest in all end-state grammars—and, especially, if these universals could be 
explained in external, functionalist terms—there would be no need for UG to explain 
uniform convergence. This wouldn’t mean that the theory was incorrect, just that it 
would be less necessary. (It’s not a mystery that trains invariably end up at a railway 
station, rather than wandering at will all over the countryside: it’s rather trickier to 
explain the directed behaviour of migratory species of birds or fish without appeal to 
some innate principles: see Dresher 1997, for discussion). The second reason that 
diversity is good for UG is that whenever UG principles do find surface expression—
and pace E&L, I believe these kinds of universals can be shown to exist, see the 
commentaries by Baker, Pesetsky, Pinker & Jackendoff, amongst others—then the 
greater areal and typological distance between two varieties showing common traits, 
the more compelling the case for UG becomes. To draw on a final analogy to 
genetics: the fact that the DNA of all humans is 99.9% identical—regardless of race, 
gender or provenance—is less compelling evidence of the genetic uniformity of all 
organic life than the fact that we share 50% of our genes with a worm (C. elegans).3  
In short, Evans & Levinson may offer us ‘eerie sights, weird and skeery 
sights’, but there’s little here to truly terrify the stouthearted generativist. 
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1 A personal note. This commentary should not be construed in any way as a personal 
attack on either of the authors, for whom I have the greatest professional respect. 
Steve Levinson, in particular, deserves my gratitude and continuing regard, not least 
because he was my first linguistics teacher (Cambridge, 1981) as well as my last-but-
one employer (Nijmegen 2003). I sincerely hope that the views presented here will be 
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interpreted in the same spirit in which they were set down. 
2 © Jerry Leiber Music/Range Road Music Inc./Silver Seahorse Music LLC/Warner 
Chappell Music Inc. Recorded by various artists, most famously, by Don McLean 
(Solo, live album). 
3 Source: ‘Worm could offer Parkinson’s Clue’ 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/tayside_and_central/8396112.stm> 
